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Abstract 
In the Riau Islands of Indonesia significant numbers of women have entered into marriages 
with men from the nearby countries of Singapore and Malaysia. In many cases, neither 
spouse migrates after marriage: instead, husband and wife continue to reside in their country 
of origin. Their close geographical proximity means that the couples can see each other 
regularly while at the same time taking advantage of the economic opportunities presented by 
living on different sides of the border. These cross-border marriages challenge the normative 
model of the nuclear cohabiting couple/family. Our research into the motivations and desires 
of these cross-border couples living in the Riau borderlands reveals that space and mobility 
mediate their interactions with the Singaporean, Malaysian and Indonesian states, thus 
producing localized accounts of citizenship in which class mobility (rather than physical 
mobility) becomes the dominant frame through which they view state regulation of marriage 
and migration. This research challenges the state-centric tendencies in some of the scholarly 
literature on international and transnational marriage which places overwhelming emphasis 
on the ability of states to regulate access to citizenship rights. In presenting a view of 
inconsistent and sometimes incoherent states, we highlight the significant differences 
between perceptions of state influence and actual state practices in relation to the regulation 
of international marriages. 
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Scholars of globalization are paying increasing attention to the impact that transnational 
migration is having on the structure of family life. Focusing on what have variously been 
referred to as examples of international marriage, transnational marriage or cross-border 
marriage, these studies seek to demonstrate the ways in which patterns of marriage and 
family forms have changed as a result of increasing mobility (Piper and Roces 2002, 
Constable 2005a). They argue that globalization not only challenges ‘the hyphen that links 
nation to state’ (Appadurai 1996, p. 19), but also the traditional relationship between the 
state and the family. These studies explore the ways in which states seek to assert 
particular visions of family life, and the ways that individuals challenge these ideologies 
through a range of transnational marriage practices. By focusing on state policies and 
processes these accounts uncover the gender and race ideologies that underpin legislation 
on immigration, marriage and employment. They suggest that despite the increasing trend 
towards dual citizenship and the formation of transnational families, nation-states continue to 
see the family as a nationally bound institution and exert control over family forms by 
managing access to citizenship rights, including the right to claim nationality through birth 
place or parentage, the right to marry or divorce, and the right to emigrate to join a foreign 
spouse (Suzuki 2003, Burgess 2004). International marriages thus bring into sharp relief 
the inherent link between citizenship rights and the nation-state. This ability of nation- 
states to impact on the married life of their citizens debunks the myth of an implicit 
distinction between the public and private (Lyons 2007), and points to a need to examine 
in greater detail the links between citizenship, social rights, and family structures. 
In paying closer attention to the role that nation-states play in shaping the private choices of 
individuals, however, it is important not to fall into the trap of overstating the power of the 
state to shape everyday practices of citizenship. Nation-states can play limited and 
contradictory roles in shaping international marriages. Nobue Suzuki’s (2000) study of 
Filipina women married to Japanese men shows that even as local government agencies 
worked to enhance international marriage options for rural Japanese men by engaging 
marriage brokers in the Philippines, national laws restricted these women’s access to 
residency. Where nation-states take a keen interest in the conferral of citizenship rights 
through international marriage, individuals are often able to develop creative responses to 
state regulation. For example, in her study of Filipinas married to Japanese men, Tomoko 
Nakamatsu (2005) recounts the story of Emillie, who arranged for her marriage agent to 
dissuade her estranged husband from divorcing her so that she did not have to leave Japan. 
This agreement continued until the agent was able to find new spouses for them both. 
Similarly, Nicole Constable’s (2003) study of Filipinas working in Hong Kong who use local 
laws to legally divorce their Filipino husbands shows that while structural factors like legal 
frameworks can constrain individuals and couples at the local level they also open up new 
transnational possibilities. Studies of cross-border marriages show similar patterns. For 
example, Matthew Amster’s (2005) study of cross-border marriages that involve illegal 
border crossings of Indonesian women into the Kelabit Highlands of Malaysia reveals that in 
some instances nation-states can take a completely hands-off approach to international 
marriage.  
These studies demonstrate that while the citizenship rights of married couples and their 
children cannot be understood without reference to the nation-state, international marriage 
practices should not be viewed solely through the lens of state control. In our research on 
cross-border couples living in the Riau Islands of Indonesia, nation-states are curiously both 
present and absent. Our examination of the motivations and desires of cross-border couples 
living in the Riau borderlands reveals that space and mobility mediate their interactions with 
the Singaporean, Malaysian and Indonesian states, thus producing very localized accounts of 
citizenship in which class mobility (rather than physical mobility) becomes the dominant 
frame through which they view state regulation of marriage and migration.  
Attention to the class dynamics of international marriage is not new. Many scholars 
have described women’s marriage mobility from the developing to the developed world as a 
form of ‘global hypergamy’: 
[I]t is global in the sense that it involves men and women from different regions of 
the world. It can be considered hypergamous – building on the conventional 
anthropological definition of ‘hypergamy’ as women marrying up into a higher 
socioeconomic group – if we conceive of ‘up’ as referring to a hierarchy or a 
chain of geographical locations. (Constable 2005b, p. 10) 
However, particular case studies of international marriage demonstrate that marriage mobility 
does not always imply upward class mobility because middle-class women may in fact 
‘marry down’ to working-class men in other countries (Freeman 2005), or working- class 
women may find themselves in more marginal social and economic positions after marriage 
(Suzuki 2005). In fact, economic marginalization is a common explanation for working-class 
men’s decision to marry foreigners – and marriage, far from improving the household’s 
economic position, may make it more precarious (Piper 1997, Wang and Chang 2002, So 
2003). Constable (2005c, p. 184) argues therefore that it is more useful to describe a general 
pattern of ‘spatial hypergamy, with women’s geographic mobility often from a poorer 
country to a richer one, even though this pattern may, in fact, say little about the particular 
social or economic mobility of any given individual or ... couple’.  
These discussions of global or spatial hypergamy assume that international marriage involves 
the migration of one spouse (usually the wife) to a more developed country. Our research into 
marriages that take place between Singaporean men and Indonesian women living in the Riau 
Islands are more accurately described as ‘cross-border’ marriages in the sense that they 
continue to traverse the national border. In these cases, neither spouse migrates after 
marriage: instead, husband and wife continue to reside in their country of origin. In the Riau 
Islands, this experience is a particular product of life in the Indonesia – Singapore – Malaysia 
borderlands. The close physical proximity of Singapore, Peninsular Malaysia and the Riau 
Islands means that the couples can see each other regularly while at the same time taking 
advantage of the opportunities presented by living on different sides of the border. For 
working-class men and women who are economically (and in some cases socially) 
marginalized in their countries of birth, these cross-border marriages allow them to 
experience a degree of upward class mobility in Indonesia. While the men’s class position in 
their home country does not change, their wives and children are able to take advantage of 
the differential exchange rate between the two nations to live a lower middle- class lifestyle 
across the border. The men themselves get to enjoy this lifestyle during their intermittent 
visits.  
Attention to the ‘marital subjectivities’ (Constable 2003, p. 164) of couples who engage in 
cross-border marriages in the Riau Islands allows us to explore the border as a site where 
individuals both challenge the normative model of the nuclear cohabiting couple/family and 
recuperate the traditional ideal of marriage as a life choice. In doing so, we question the state-
centric tendencies in some of the scholarly literature on international marriage which places 
overwhelming emphasis on the ability of states to regulate access to citizenship rights (see, 
for example, Piper 1997, So 2003). Even in those studies that do not explicitly engage with 
the issue of citizenship rights, the state’s ability to regulate migration flows and enforce 
marriage/divorce legislation is taken a priori to explain the context in which cross-border or 
international marriage occurs (see Wang and Chang 2002, Freeman 2005, Nakamatsu 2005, 
Shen 2005, Thai 2005). We are not suggesting that nation-states do not have an interest in 
regulating their national boundaries – nor that nation-states have no impact on the marital 
lives of their citizens – but rather that for some cross-border couples, the state is of secondary 
importance. In presenting a view of inconsistent and sometimes incoherent states, we 
highlight the significant differences between perceptions of state influence and actual state 
practices, and show that ‘frontiers, far from being homogenous sites of state regulation, 
remain creative sites of social interaction’ (Amster 2005, p. 147). Our study thus supports the 
work of other borderland studies which show that ‘local border cultures almost always 
transcend the limits of the state’ (Donnan and Wilson 1999, p. 12).1  
This paper draws on ethnographic data collected from Indonesian women who live in the 
towns of Tanjung Pinang (Bintan) and Tanjung Balai Karimun, and from the relatives and 
husbands of some of these women.2 These stories demonstrate how men and women 
creatively negotiate the transnational terrain to achieve their desired status as married 
couples. From the perspectives of both the Singaporean and Indonesian states, these 
relationships are far from successful – they involve men and women on the margins of 
society, they often contravene immigration or family law, and they seldom result in the 
creation of a cohabiting nuclear family. The inevitable geographical distances and emotional 
dislocations that define these relationships mean that the bonds between these couples are 
often tenuous. But while these relationships may not be successful in the eyes of either the 
state or the wider community, cross-border marriage nonetheless offers the possibility of 
emotional and financial security, as well as personal empowerment and autonomy. By 
exploring the place of love, sex and intimacy for women and men who live their lives across 
the Indonesia – Singapore border, we shed light on the complex social and economic reasons 
that give rise to cross-border marriages in the Riau Islands.  
 
Meeting across borders 
The Indonesian islands of Karimun and Bintan, which are the focus of our study, are located 
a short distance away from Singapore and the southern tip of Peninsular Malaysia by high-
speed ferry, with journeys lasting between 45 and 105 minutes depending on the destination. 
In 2006, together with the island of Batam, it was announced that they would become part of 
a Special Economic Zone (SEZ) with Singapore. The SEZ aims to capitalize on the islands’ 
close proximity to Singapore to enhance economic development. Before the SEZ was 
announced, the three islands were part of the Indonesia – Malaysia – Singapore Growth 
Triangle (IMS-GT) which was established in 1990. The underpinning philosophy of the IMS-
GT was economic complementarity in which Singaporean capital would be combined with 
Indonesian and Malaysian labour and land to facilitate cross- border regional growth (Sparke 
et al. 2004). In recent years, the promise of the IMS-GT has not been realized and the new 
SEZ is seen as an effort to reinvigorate economic development in the islands.      
However, the history of economic interaction between the Riau Islands, Malaysia and 
Singapore is much longer than the life of the Special Economic Zone, or the growth triangle 
that preceded it. Both Bintan and Karimun are home to large towns and villages that trace 
long-term family and business connections to Chinese and Malay communities in both 
Singapore and Malaysia (Ford and Lyons 2006).3 Since the 1990s, foreign investment in the 
islands has resulted in significant social and economic change, not all of which has been 
positive. Despite the promise that foreign investment would result in job creation and 
economic growth, the port, manufacturing and tourism sectors established in Karimun and 
Bintan provide limited employment for locals. Notwithstanding occasional government 
crackdowns, the vice industries of prostitution, gambling and drugs prospered. The increasing 
ease of travel from Singapore and Malaysia, and in-migration to the islands from other parts 
of Indonesia, provided conditions for these industries to thrive. As a result, the Riau Islands 
became home to a large sex industry that predominantly caters to foreign men (Ford and 
Lyons 2008).  
The presence of prostitution in the islands shapes international marriage practices in many 
ways. The close proximity of the islands to Singapore in particular has given rise to the 
formation of long-term relationships between Singaporean men and sex workers, so-called 
‘second wives’ or ‘Batam wives’.4 The use of the term ‘wife’ to describe these relationships 
does not infer that it is a formalized or legal marriage but implies that the relationship extends 
beyond a casual sexual encounter to include the provision of a home (bought or rented by the 
Singaporean ‘husband’) and an allowance. In Indonesia local government crackdowns on the 
simpanan (lit. kept women) of foreign men have meant that the women are often the target of 
harassment by local authorities. To avoid these problems, some couples perform a religious 
or customary marriage; however, these marriages are not considered to be legal by either the 
Indonesian or Singaporean governments unless they are presided over by a recognized 
Solemnizer of Marriages and a legal Notice of Marriage has been approved by the relevant 
authority. It should be noted here that not all couples enter into a religious marriage simply to 
avoid harassment. Single Singaporean men may agree to a religious ceremony (rather than a 
legal marriage) with their Indonesian wives because they want to be married in the eyes of 
God and/or the community, but want to keep the marriage a secret from their Singaporean 
families who may not approve of their choice of marriage partner (Arshad 2003).   
For other couples, the decision may be based on the fact that the men are already legally 
married to Singaporean women and marrying legally a second time may not be possible. The 
Singapore Women’s Charter provides only for monogamous marriages but Syariah Law, 
which governs marriages between Muslim couples, allows a man to marry as many as four 
women at one time. However, the marriage must have the existing wife’s (or wives’) 
approval for a further marriage and the man must demonstrate that he has:  
the capability to provide a life that is well balanced where the financial, physical 
and emotional well being of his wives are concerned; has a good marriage life 
currently and the adverse is not the reason he has decided to take another wife; 
and have specific reasons, which are benefits that his first marriage cannot provide 
but his second marriage can. In this context, love is not one of the benefits. 
(Registry of Muslim Marriages 2002)  
In the case of Muslim men who take a second wife overseas, a religious ceremony may be a 
means to address his and his new wife’s religious convictions without having to gain 
approval from his first wife and their children. Indonesia’s 1974 Marriage Law permits 
polygyny among Muslims if the man obtains permission from his wife/wives and is able to 
meet the needs of his wives and children equally (Katjasungkana 2004). Malaysia’s Islamic 
Family Law Act permits polygyny on the same grounds. In the case of the latter, Nik Noriani 
bt Nik Badli Shah (2004) notes that Syariah judges tend to give emphasis to financial 
capacity rather than other factors, and that Malaysia’s system of separate state jurisdictions 
allows Malaysian men to ‘shop around’ for the most convenient law for their personal 
circumstances. Men who contract polygamous marriages without the court’s approval are 
merely ordered to pay a small fine.  
Religious differences can also influence a couple’s decision to marry. Indonesia’s 1974 
Marriage Law does not permit mixed religious marriage unless it is allowed by the religious 
laws of both partners (Katjasungkana 2004, pp. 163 – 164), and consequently does not permit 
a Muslim woman to marry a man of another faith. A similar law exists in Singapore where 
two laws govern the registration and solemnization of marriages – the Women’s Charter 
which deals with marriages between non-Muslims, and the Administration of Muslim Law 
Act (commonly referred to as Syariah Law) which governs marriages amongst Muslims (see 
Part VI). A Muslim and a non-Muslim can marry under the Women’s Charter, but under the 
Syariah Court a non-Muslim seeking to marry a Muslim must first obtain a certificate of 
conversion. Conversion involves formal classes and a religious test, after which a 
Certification of Confirmation is issued by the Majlis Ugama Islam Singapura (MUIS) – the 
Islamic Religious Council of Singapore.  
The formation of mistress relationships, sometimes involving religious or customary 
marriage rites, provides sex workers with a steady income and a place to live. However, the 
instability of these relationships often means that for the women a return to sex work is a 
common outcome. For their foreign ‘husbands’, mistress relationships may be more costly 
than casual sexual encounters, but the stability and intimacy of a long-term relationship 
brings with it other benefits, including the health and psychological benefits of regular 
contact with a single partner as well as social prestige. Many men prefer mistress 
arrangements because they dislike the negotiations and clear monetary transactions involved 
in casual paid sex. They may also believe that by having a single partner they are less likely 
to contract a sexually transmitted disease. While the men may assume that a mistress 
relationship implies that they have sole sexual access to their ‘wives’, many women continue 
to supplement their incomes through paid casual sex with other men. For some women these 
‘extra-marital’ relationships may act as a safety net in case their primary relationship 
dissolves. Other women may continue to have sexual relationships with their pre-existing 
legal husbands, boyfriends or pimps. Although such relationships are clearly based on an 
economic transaction in which neither partner has an expectation of a permanent 
arrangement, many couples express genuine affection for each other. At the same time, while 
the lack of legal standing means that neither the woman nor man can be charged with 
bigamy, a further implication of these unions is that neither partner has legal recourse in 
relation to property, custody of children, or maintenance when the relationship ends (see 
Vasoo and Yap 1999, Arshad 2003).5 
Mistress relationships are not the only way in which sex workers living in the Riau Islands 
enter into long-term cohabiting arrangements with foreign men. Although legal marriages are 
less common than cohabitation, they offer a means for sex workers to leave the sex industry 
altogether if they choose to. One of our informants, Ani, met her husband Ah Huat in 1999.6 
Ah Huat is a 57 year old Singaporean Chinese widower who paid S$2000 to Ani’s Madam to 
release her debt with the brothel. Ani is originally from a transmigrant family in Lampung, 
who was sold into prostitution by a friend who promised her legitimate work in Malaysia. 
The debt owed to the brothel owner consisted of the costs incurred in her purchase, and other 
expenses, for example, food and healthcare, incurred while working in the brothel. After 
paying off the debt, Ah Huat brought Ani to Singapore to meet his grown-up children. They 
were eventually married in Tanjung Balai Karimun after Ah Huat converted from Buddhism 
to Islam, allowing him to contract a legal marriage under Indonesian law. At first the local 
authorities in Karimun were unwilling to marry them for fear that as a foreigner Ah Huat 
would renege and sue them. This attitude partly reflects a dominant view held by Riau 
Islanders that Singaporean men are interested in having casual sex with local women rather 
than in forming legitimate relationships. The religious or customary rites that some men 
undertake are thus considered to be ‘marriages of convenience’ rather than committed 
relationships. The local marriage authorities in Tanjung Balai may have feared that Ani’s 
husband actually intended to enter into one of these short-term arrangements without 
realizing that an authorized marriage was in fact legally binding. The couple finally managed 
to marry after the Singaporean authorities issued another letter confirming that Ah Huat was 
free to marry.7 The couple have since bought a two-bedroom house in Tanjung Balai where 
Ani lives with her child from her previous marriage.  
Former freelance sex worker Lia also married a foreigner, in her case a Malaysian Muslim 
man. Lia had spent a short time in Singapore as a foreign domestic worker and after returning 
to her village in Deli Serdang a friend suggested that she come and work in Tanjung Balai 
Karimun to earn money to support her two children. Lia chose to marry her husband Farid 
after weighing up another marriage proposal from a former client, a Singaporean Indian 
divorcee. Although Lia’s other suitor offered her a chance to live in developed Singapore, she 
was worried that because he was Hindu and she is Muslim their religious beliefs were 
incompatible. The prospect of living in Singapore was not attractive either, not least because 
she would be further from her children, who live with their grandparents in North Sumatra. 
After working in the sex industry for a few years, Lia decided that it was better to be the legal 
second wife of a Muslim man and to live in Tanjung Balai. Farid’s first wife cannot bear 
children and knows he has taken a second wife, but they have never met. Not everything went 
smoothly with Lia and Farid’s marriage. When the couple went to ask about the procedure for 
marrying under Indonesian law, they were tricked into paying S$1000 for a false marriage 
licence. When she discovered that the licence was a fake, Lia reported it to the local Office of 
Religious Affairs, the government department responsible for Muslim marriages, who in turn 
took the matter to the police. Farid was very angry about the situation, and Lia was worried 
when he left for Malaysia that he might never come back. To her relief, he returned and, after 
legally marrying, he rented a house in Tanjung Balai for her to live in.  
For Ani and Lia, legal marriage to a former client has proven to be a secure means to leave 
the sex industry behind.8 While neither woman discussed the strategies they employed to 
negotiate marriage as a legitimate option with their clients, the stories of other sex workers 
reveal that such outcomes require careful and deliberate management.9 In Ani’s case, leaving 
the sex industry was further complicated by the need to repay a large debt owed to the brothel 
owner. That both women were able to arrange marriages within two years of entering the sex 
industry points to their interpersonal skills and foresight. At the same time, we do not want to 
suggest that these are just marriages of convenience. Ani says that her second husband is 
‘everything’ to her. She cannot believe how different he is to her first husband, who beat her 
and cheated on her when she was pregnant. Although Ah Huat is old and not very good-
looking, she claims she would not swap him for the most handsome man in the world because 
he loves her, her child and her family. She says, ‘I give thanks constantly, I am very happy’. 
For his part, Ah Huat expresses considerable affection for his new wife and her child. His 
decision to convert to Islam in order to marry her was not easy, but now that they are married 
he looks forward to moving to Tanjung Balai permanently once he retires. Lia’s husband too 
clearly cares for his new wife, and persevered with the marriage despite the initial legal 
setbacks. Lia is less romantically involved. Her perspective on her marriage, like that of 
many of her friends, is that ‘It’s better to marry one of them and just wait for him [to visit] 
than to have to have multiple partners every day’. Even so, Lia worries about her financial 
security. Many of her friends who have had long-term relationships with foreigners were 
abandoned when they became pregnant. In contrast, the future of Lia’s marriage could 
depend on her ability to conceive, as Farid took a second wife because he wishes to have 
children. Lia worries that even if they do have a child together, the financial and physical 
pressures of travelling from Kuala Lumpur to Tanjung Balai may eventually threaten the 
marriage.  
Sex workers are not the only women who meet and marry foreigners in the Riau Islands. For 
another group of women, marriage to a Singaporean may occur as a result of longstanding 
family ties across the Straits. Halimah was born in Singapore, but her family moved to Jambi 
on mainland Sumatra when she was a small child. As an adult, she moved to Tanjung Pinang 
where she married a local man. Halimah has many relatives in Singapore – in fact many more 
than in Indonesia – so when it was time for her four daughters to marry, she used her family 
contacts to set them up with Singaporean men. Halimah’s youngest daughter fell in love with 
an Indonesian and subsequently married him, but Halimah succeeded in arranging marriages 
with Singaporean Malays for her other three daughters.10 Halimah’s family is a talking-point 
in the neighbourhood. Although many Malay women in Tanjung Pinang marry Singaporeans, 
it is unusual for so many women in a single family to do so. Halimah’s neighbours gossip 
constantly about them, complaining that Halimah thinks Indonesians are not good enough for 
her family. Halimah, however, cares little about what her neighbours say – her Singaporean 
sons-in- law are a source of pride to her, as well as a guarantee of economic security.  
Halimah’s oldest daughter Zulfiyanti, who is married to Hambali, a security officer at Changi 
Airport, is now a Permanent Resident of Singapore. She lives in Singapore with her husband 
and children. Halimah’s middle daughters, Mardiyah and Katijah, continue to live with their 
mother in Tanjung Pinang. Their Singaporean husbands, Yusof and Yasin, visit them and 
their children on a regular basis, but have not considered moving to the island permanently. 
Nor have they considered moving their families to Singapore. The children’s citizenship 
status is somewhat ambiguous despite the fact that both Singaporean and Indonesian 
citizenship laws consistently apply the principle of ius sanguinis (citizenship by descent) to 
the children of Singaporean men. Under Singaporean law, children born overseas to a 
Singaporean father are automatically granted Singaporean citizenship. Under the 1958 
Indonesian Citizenship Law children born to an Indonesian woman who is married to a 
foreign citizen follow the citizenship of their fathers.11 However, Halimah’s grandchildren 
have not applied for Singaporean citizenship because this would complicate their residency in 
the islands. The 1958 Law requires foreign children to be sponsored by an Indonesian in 
order to remain in Indonesia, and permits are usually not valid for longer than five years. 
Typically an Indonesian mother cannot sponsor her own child and the children cannot apply 
for Indonesian citizenship until they reach the age of 18. In changes to the Citizenship Law in 
2006, Indonesian women can now pass on citizenship to their children and such children can 
hold dual citizenship until the age of 18 (see Tjakrawinata and Wellesley 2006). Until 2006, 
the ‘foreign’ children of legally married cross-border couples were at the mercy of the local 
authorities, who could ban them from attending local schools or demand that they pay for 
expensive annual residents’ permits. Given the prevailing laws at the time of our interviews, 
it is not surprising that Halimah’s family were reluctant to discuss the ways in which they had 
negotiated the citizenship laws to enable the children to reside in Tanjung Pinang and attend 
Indonesian schools.  
Although most women in the Riau Islands who marry Singaporean men meet their husbands 
in the Islands through work or family connections, there are some exceptions. Siti left her 
home town of Tanjung Pinang to travel to Singapore to work as a domestic worker for a 
distant relative in 1989 when she was 23. She went to Singapore hoping to have new 
experiences and save some money for the future, and enjoyed her 10 years there, where her 
boss treated her like a niece rather than as a servant. On her one day off every week, Siti 
spent time socializing with other Indonesian women at the Indonesian Embassy or at Marina 
Bay. It was there that she met Hamid, a working-class Malay Singaporean. Hamid was a 50 
year old divorced father of three who earned a living as an odd-jobs man. Not long after Siti 
met him, her parents – who did not know she had a boyfriend in Singapore – decided it was 
time for her to get married, and matched her up with a distant relative, an Indonesian man 
who was working on a plantation in Malaysia. She reluctantly agreed, but after the wedding 
she continued to work in Singapore and her husband went back to Malaysia. They initially 
kept in contact by telephone, and her husband sent her some of his monthly wages. Within 
months, he stopped sending her money and claimed that because she was working he did not 
need to support her. Angry with her husband, Siti started seeing Hamid again. He still wanted 
to marry her and when Siti told her parents she wanted a divorce after a short period of 
marriage, they were furious.  
But Siti had made up her mind, and went ahead with the wedding despite her parents’ 
objections. Siti returned to Tanjung Pinang where she lives with her parents and where her 
husband visits her every few months. For women like Siti, employment abroad is quite 
lucrative, but it poses many problems, including the inference that young women who work 
overseas are more likely to be influenced by ‘bad’ ideas and immoral forces. As a single 
woman, Siti also found that her long stint working overseas effectively barred her from the 
local marriage market and by her early 30s she was considered an ‘old maid’. Of the women 
we have spoken to, Siti is the only one to describe hers as purely a ‘love marriage’. She chose 
the stigma and shame of divorce, made even more embarrassing to her parents because it 
occurred a short time after they had arranged her first marriage, in order to marry her 
Singaporean boyfriend. Unlike former sex workers who legally marry, Siti is not worried that 
the marriage will end but seems resigned to a life in which she doesn’t see her husband for 
months on end and during his absences has little contact with him. For her this is better than a 
loveless marriage to an Indonesian who works overseas.  
In contrast to Siti, whose marriage has not brought her financial security, financial support is 
an important factor in Ani’s and Lia’s decision to marry because it provides a means to 
escape the drudgery of the low-paid, dirty, dangerous jobs in which they were employed. 
Poor, working-class women in the Riau Islands have few job opportunities, and choices are 
even more limited for women like Ani who are sold into prostitution. However, more 
significant than financial gain has been the social standing that these women obtain by virtue 
of being married. The social stigma attached to sex work is very strong in Indonesia and 
marriage provides sex workers with a means to become ‘respectable’. For Ani and Lia cross-
border marriage provides an opportunity to ‘try again’. After she married, Ani finally had the 
courage to return to her home village and visit her parents and child. Although she had 
married a foreigner and, more problematically, a much older Chinese man, her status as a 
married woman meant that she could hold her head up in her home village and effectively 
bury her previous life as a sex worker. Even Lia, who became the legal second wife of a 
Malaysian man, has obtained a socially more acceptable position as a ‘wife’ in the 
community.12 
Finance is also an important consideration for the working-class men who seek first or second 
wives in the Islands. Siti’s husband Hamid, who has worked as an odd-jobs man and sub-
contractor since his first marriage fell apart, can ill-afford to support Siti in Tanjung Pinang, 
and could certainly not afford another Singaporean wife. For him, marriage to Siti brings the 
promise of a loving relationship into old age – a prospect that was not available to him in 
Singapore. Yusof, the husband of Halimah’s second daughter Mardiyah, is in a similar 
financial situation. Yusof did not complete primary school, and his job in maintenance pays 
very poorly. When asked why he had not married a Singaporean, Yusof’s answer was 
unequivocal: ‘It wasn’t that I didn’t want to marry a Singaporean, but it was just too 
expensive. Everything in Singapore is expensive, so lots of men look for wives here.’ For 
Yusof and Hamid, the financial cost of marriage is twofold – the cost of a wedding ceremony, 
and the cost of supporting a wife and family. What remains unspoken in their accounts are 
the difficulties that such men face in finding suitable spouses in Singapore. The tendency for 
women to ‘marry up’ and men to ‘marry down’ has limited the marriage opportunities for 
two groups of Singaporeans – tertiary educated professional women, and working-class men 
with little education (AWARE 2004). Marriage opportunities diminish further as individuals 
age, or if they have been previously divorced or widowed. In these circumstances, 
international marriage allows Singaporean men to fulfil their desire to marry and to meet their 
social and family obligations as married men.  
Our interviews reveal that cross-border marriages between foreign men and Indonesian 
women living in the Riau Islands take place for a variety of reasons. Like couples elsewhere, 
they meet in the workplace, in social settings, or through friends and family. While some 
marry for love and others for economic security, all experience some degree of emotional and 
physical intimacy in their relationships. In the case of the marriages described above, 
however, this intimacy is shaped by the reality of living across national borders. Only one of 
these cross-border couples live together permanently – in all other cases the Indonesian wife 
lives in the Riau Islands and her husband visits her from his country of origin.13 For most of 
their married lives the couples have spent considerable periods apart. The men spend varied 
lengths of time in the Riau Islands visiting their wives. Ani’s husband Ah Huat used to visit 
her once a month when he was still working full-time, but now he spends more time in 
Tanjung Balai. Once he is fully retired, he plans to live with Ani in their Tanjung Balai home. 
Lia’s husband visits once a month, usually for three to four days, but sometimes up to a week. 
If Farid is too busy to come to Indonesia, she sometimes goes to Malaysia, where they meet 
in a hotel. There is no work for her husband in the Islands, but she is reluctant to move to 
Malaysia because her children are still in North Sumatra. Halimah’s oldest daughter lives in 
Singapore with her husband in a more ‘standard’ international marriage, but the Singaporean 
husbands of her two middle daughters visit every second week, for a day or two at a time. 
After her wedding, Siti’s husband spent a month in Tanjung Pinang, and then he’d visit her 
for three or four days every month. In more recent years, however, sometimes six or seven 
months pass between visits, although when Hamid comes he tends to stay for two or three 
months depending on how much money he can save before his arrival.  
Class mobility and cross-border marriage  
The decisions that these cross-border couples make to live their married lives across national 
borders is a product of the border itself. The close proximity between the Riau Islands and 
Singapore and Malaysia means that travel not only takes little time but is also relatively 
cheap.14 Indonesia’s immigration regime for ASEAN passport holders means that 
Singaporeans and Malaysians can enter Indonesia without a visa and stay for up to 30 days on 
a tourist pass. Passing through the immigration checkpoints on either side of the border takes 
a matter of minutes for the foreign husbands of these Indonesian women. Frequent travel 
between their home country and Indonesia would be much less practical for these men if their 
wives lived in most other parts of the Indonesian archipelago because they would normally 
need to travel by air, which is much more expensive, or by a mixture of sea and land 
transport, which is very time-consuming. There are, however, other places in Indonesia which 
share a similar degree of geographical proximity to a neighbouring country, particularly on 
the island of Borneo where Malaysia and Indonesia share a land border. Amster’s (2005) 
study of Borneo, for example, describes international marriages involving couples who 
cohabit in Malaysia after the illegal migration of the Indonesian wife.       
But spatiality alone does not explain the decision to live on separate sides of the border in the 
case of these women from the Riau Islands. To understand these cross-border marriages it is 
important to examine the class and gender dimensions of state regulation of citizenship in 
both Indonesia and in the husband’s country of origin. For example, Singapore’s immigration 
law only grants the foreign wives of Singaporean citizens the right of permanent residence if 
their Singaporean husbands can demonstrate that they have the financial means to support 
them.15 Working-class men have found it difficult to obtain visitors’ passes, work permits, 
and permanent residency permits for their foreign spouses and children because their incomes 
are deemed to be too low (Mathi 2000).16 Obtaining residency is even more difficult for 
women who have previously held work permits to enter and work in Singapore. Under 
Singapore’s Immigration Law the Marriage Restriction Policy prohibits current work permit 
holders from marrying Singaporean citizens or permanent residents without the Ministry of 
Manpower’s approval. If the marriage takes place abroad, the work permit holders are barred 
from re-entering Singapore. The Singapore government claims that the purpose of this 
restriction is to prevent large numbers of low-skilled foreign workers settling in Singapore 
through marriage and placing a potential welfare burden on the state. This sentiment is 
summed up in a statement by Singaporean MP Mr Sin Boon Ann who claimed that ‘We can’t 
afford to have liberal policies because once we open the floodgates, we’ll be overwhelmed’ 
(cited in Lim 1999, p. 44). As a consequence, some Indonesian wives of Singaporean men 
find themselves confined to the Indonesian side of the border. Siti is one such ex-work permit 
holder who has found it difficult to travel to Singapore. Not long after her wedding, she spent 
a month in Singapore during and after Idul Fitri, the Muslim festival at the end of the fasting 
month of Ramadhan. The following year she stayed for two weeks. Both times she had 
trouble entering Singapore. She has not been there since, and her passport has now expired. 
Siti knew she would have problems getting permanent residency in Singapore because of her 
status as an ex-domestic worker and her husband’s marginal economic position, which is 
made worse by his responsibilities to his children from his first marriage. Despite these 
difficulties she was not dissuaded from marrying the ‘love of her life’ – the fact that they 
would have trouble living together was of secondary consideration.  
Although the other women do not face the legal problems entering Singapore that Siti faces 
as a former work permit holder, almost all of them have had some difficulties dealing with 
the Singapore Immigration and Checkpoints Authority (ICA), which carefully screens all 
Indonesian tourists and refuses them entry if they are suspected of being involved in illegal 
activities. Ani found it difficult to get through the immigration checkpoint when she visited 
Ah Huat before their marriage: once she was sent back to Indonesia for not carrying enough 
‘show money’ (uang tunjuk),17 and another time she was tested for drugs. It has been easier 
since she married because Ah Huat’s identity card and marriage details have been entered 
into the immigration database, and despite these early difficulties with the ICA, Ani asserts 
that she could apply for permanent residency if she wanted to because Ah Huat is happy for 
her to move to Singapore even though money would be tight. Ultimately, however, other 
considerations have weighed more heavily on her mind. Ani’s natal family has expressed 
strong opposition to the possibility of Ani moving to Singapore with her son. In addition, her 
son could not migrate without being adopted by Ah Huat, which would have been difficult 
since his father (Ani’s ex-husband) is still alive. It is also important to note that Indonesia’s 
1958 Citizenship Law did not allow dual citizenship so if Ani had obtained Singaporean 
citizenship she would have lost her Indonesian citizenship, thus potentially making it difficult 
for her to spend extended periods in Indonesia with her child and parents, or to own (or 
inherit) land.18 In Ani’s account of why she has stayed living in the islands, however, the 
Singapore state’s tight control on unskilled migration does not figure. She asserts that if she 
wanted to migrate to Singapore to live with her husband she would simply do so, without 
problem. At this stage of her life other considerations have simply taken precedence.  
Halimah’s eldest daughter Zulfiyanti was able to migrate permanently because her husband 
Hambali earns a stable if modest living. However, Halimah’s other sons-in-law earn much 
less, so even if her daughters Mardiyah and Katijah wanted to move to Singapore 
permanently it is most likely that their applications would be refused. Although their 
husbands Yusof and Yasin would have difficulty proving they can support their wives, the 
men nonetheless assume that their wives would be able to migrate if they wanted to. It is 
evident from our interviews, however, that the possibility of migration is often not seriously 
considered. Instead they presented their cross-border living arrangements as purely a lifestyle 
choice. Cross-border living arrangements allowed them to stretch their minimal wages much 
further while at the same time allowing the men to enjoy the slower, more laidback lifestyle 
in the Islands whenever they wanted. They did not believe that this arrangement had a 
negative impact on their family life or on their children’s education. Yusof could see no 
advantages for his own children in living in Singapore. When asked if he planned to take his 
children to Singapore for secondary school, Yusof said that he was very happy with the 
standard of schooling in Tanjung Pinang, and was able to pay for extra tuition for his children 
there, which he could not have afforded in Singapore. He spoke pityingly about Zulfiyanti’s 
daughter Aman, who enjoyed spending time with her extended family in Tanjung Pinang so 
much that she often returned to her home in Singapore in tears.  
These accounts reveal a gap between states’ regulation of unskilled migration and the 
personal perceptions of those individuals who may be affected by that regulation. None of the 
men considered migrating to Indonesia because their capacity to earn an income in their 
country of origin is much higher than if they moved to the Islands. While many asserted that 
they like the pace of life in Indonesia because it less stressful, they associated that kind of 
lifestyle with future retirement. Nonetheless, such a future scenario would not see them 
relinquishing their citizenship or applying for a long-term stay permit. Under Indonesia’s 
1992 Immigration Law, foreign citizens who wish to live in Indonesia must obtain a stay 
permit for the purposes of work, business or tourism. Indonesian women are not permitted to 
sponsor their husbands so in most cases they must be sponsored by an employer 
(Tjakrawinata and Wellesley 2006), which leads to numerous problems, particularly when 
husbands lose their jobs. While these laws create significant difficulties for the foreign 
spouses of Indonesians living elsewhere in Indonesia, the ease of cross- border travel in the 
Riau Islands makes such regulations relatively unimportant for Singaporeans and Malaysians. 
The ease of ferry travel to both countries, combined with the low cost of tickets, means that 
foreign husbands who ‘live’ in the islands can easily return to their countries of origin every 
month for a few days before re-entering Indonesia on a new social pass. By retaining their 
citizenship, these men further benefit from their access to a range of services in their home 
country, including preservation of superannuation funds and medical care. Retention of one’s 
citizenship is also considered to be wise in view of Indonesia’s unstable social and economic 
conditions.  
Like their husbands, the women also expressed the view that their decision to remain in the 
Riau Islands is a lifestyle choice. Despite Singapore’s higher standard of living and 
cosmopolitan lifestyle, none of the women liked living in high-rise apartments which they 
found dislocated from the community atmosphere of village life. Siti asserts that she would 
not have migrated even if it had been possible, because she doesn’t get on with her husband’s 
family. ‘Singaporean people’, she says, ‘just think about themselves’. At first Ani was 
impressed by the orderliness and beauty of the city, and the vibrancy of the nightlife 
compared with Tanjung Balai’s sleepy provincial atmosphere. Her visits increased in 
frequency and length after the wedding, but soon she too tired of Singapore. She disliked the 
pace of life, had difficulty communicating in English or Chinese, and found her long days at 
home alone in their flat in Singapore boring and the cost of living too expensive. Like Ani, 
Mardiyah and Katijah also enjoy the extra physical space that their Tanjung Pinang house 
provides and the slow pace of life in the Islands. They also liked being close to their mother 
and friends. They felt they had a far better lifestyle than their sister Zulfiyanti. These views of 
Singapore are not uncommon amongst Riau Islanders (see Ford and Lyons 2006). Lia too 
disliked the pace and style of life in Singapore and this was another factor in her decision to 
marry a Malaysian. She felt trapped in Singapore because she felt that everything was over-
regulated, and although people lived close together in flats, they did not know their 
neighbours. If she didn’t already have children, Lia would have been much more open to the 
idea of living in Malaysia which she said was not too much different from Indonesia.  
The cost of living in Singapore is clearly a significant factor in the other couples’ decisions to 
remain separated. Siti’s financial circumstances are more difficult than the other women’s. 
During the Indonesian economic crisis of 1997 – 1998,19 Hamid had plenty of money and Siti 
could live well, but now he brings very little – a few hundred dollars at most. He doesn’t have 
a permanent job and as he gets older he is finding it more difficult to make ends meet. The 
cost of living in Singapore is constantly rising, and although his children are now grown up, 
family obligations continue to drain his resources. Although Siti originally lived on her own 
in Tanjung Pinang, she has returned to live with her parents in order to cut costs. For a time 
she took in washing to supplement her meagre savings but Hamid did not approve. He said 
she had worked too long as a maid already, and it was time for her to rest. Hamid claims that 
if they chose to live in Singapore, they would both have to live on one wage, so it is better if 
Siti lives in Indonesia because the cost of living is much cheaper and she can stay with her 
family. The couple look forward to the time when Hamid can access his state superannuation 
fund, and their financial position will improve.  
In contrast, Ani and Lia are better off than most. Ani’s husband provides her with Rp. 
4,000,00020 housekeeping money per month, but also pays for other expenses when he visits, 
while Lia’s husband sends her 1500 Malaysian ringgit21 per month to cover her living costs. 
These allowances are well in excess of the official minimum wage in Karimun, which was set 
at Rp. 766,000 in 2006 (Batam Pos Online 2006). Yusof and Yamin pool their resources, and 
also manage to provide a lower middle-class lifestyle for their wives and children. The 
women, however, are not the only ones to enjoy a comfortable living. The favourable 
exchange rate with both the Singapore dollar and Malaysian ringgit means that the men are 
able to afford a comfortable lifestyle in Indonesia including a relatively large house, and the 
chance to indulge in relatively expensive food such as seafood during their visits. These 
working-class men, economically marginalized in their home countries, can ‘live like kings’ 
in the Riau Islands. The split location of income (Singapore/Malaysia) and consumption 
(Indonesia) allows most of the men to provide their wives (and children) with a relatively 
comfortable lifestyle in the present. This investment, while it may be built on bonds of love, 
sex and other forms of intimacy, also rests on an expectation that the men themselves will be 
able to enjoy the benefits of a lower middle-class status during their visits, and on a more 
permanent basis in the future.22 
Conclusion  
Attention to laws governing marriage and divorce, immigration and naturalization, and the 
citizenship of children, demonstrate that marriage is primarily understood within the bounds 
of the nation-state, and that significant barriers therefore exist to the formation of 
international marriages. In the case of the cross-border marriages under study in the Riau 
Islands, focus on the marriage and immigration laws of Indonesia and Singapore reveals 
similar constraints on the formation of nuclear, cohabiting families. We asserted in our 
introduction, however, that a state-centric approach to the study of international marriage 
risks focusing on the problems that couples face in becoming married (or divorced) or in 
migrating in order to live together and thus overlooks the opportunities that cross- border 
marriage practices provide. The individuals in our study live their marriages across borders 
for a variety of reasons, and in some cases they may see the border as extending, rather than 
restricting, the choices that are available to them as married couples. In the stories that these 
women tell about their married lives, the state is largely absent. All, including Lia, have 
experienced the power of the Singapore state to restrict their entry into Singapore, but these 
controls appear to play a relatively insignificant role in their lives. Siti’s problem with 
entering Singapore as a former work permit holder simply provides her with another reason 
not to spend time in the city-state. Migration for Ani is complicated by the presence of a child 
from her previous marriage whom she is reluctant to leave behind. In contrast, Mardiyah and 
Katijah assume – perhaps falsely – that they could move to Singapore, as their sister 
Zulfiyanti has, but have not explored that option seriously because it would not make 
financial or social sense. For all of the couples in this study, the economic logic of 
maintaining split households far outweighs any emotional desire to cohabit on either side of 
the border. Similarly, while the ability of nation-states to regulate migration flows across the 
border is a practical reality, neither the Indonesian nor Singaporean state looms large in the 
reasons behind their decision to live on opposite sides of the border. Instead, it is the class 
mobility that such marriages offer that is much more significant.  
An understanding of cross-border marriage as a form of class mobility requires a shift away 
from traditional views, which attribute the class of unwaged women solely to the class 
position of the main male income earner (usually a husband or father). The strong association 
between a woman’s marital and employment status, and her class position means that women 
can experience significant class mobility during the course of their lives (Prandy 1986, p. 
141, Walby 1986, pp. 26 – 27). The majority of the Indonesian women described in this study 
have clearly experienced a shift in their class location so long as they continue to reside in the 
Riau Islands. For these women, the economic benefits of cross-border marriage are 
immediate. Favourable exchange rates between the Singapore dollar (or Malaysian ringgit) 
and the Indonesian rupiah, combined with the lower cost of living in the Riau Islands, allow 
them to visibly consume a lower middle-class lifestyle. The women (and their children) are 
not only better off financially than if they had married working-class Indonesian men, but are 
better off than if they had migrated to Singapore, or even Malaysia. Their husbands do not 
experience class mobility in the same way. For the men the economic advantages to be 
gained from the differential exchange rates are usually deferred. While their wives and 
families immediately enter the ranks of the lower middle classes in Indonesia, the men retain 
their marginal status as poor, working-class men in Singapore. They look forward to their 
visits to the Islands, and to retirement, when they will be able to live with their wives in 
Indonesia and enjoy their financial investments in property and consumer goods. Meanwhile, 
their families’ ability to retain their new class location is dependent on the male 
breadwinner’s ability to earn more than a subsistence wage in his home country.  
While all the couples reflected on a range of possible situations in which the couples could 
live permanently under one roof, they repeatedly emphasized the positive aspects of their 
current arrangements. The foreign husbands involved in these cross-border marriages appear 
to be satisfied with their living arrangements, perhaps because it saves them money or 
provides them with greater personal freedom. The women too benefit from greater levels of 
personal autonomy because their husbands live abroad. More importantly, for the Indonesian 
wives of foreign men, marriage is a goal in itself.23 For Ani and Lia, who face the social 
stigma attached to sex work, the social acceptance that they obtain through marriage cannot 
be overlooked. Marriage has made them ‘respectable’ again (Lyons and Ford 2008). 
Although Ani married an old Chinese foreigner, her status as a married woman restored her 
self-confidence and allowed her to finally establish a ‘real family’ with her child. Lia too 
hopes that she will be able to have a child with her husband and establish a family. Siti chose 
the stigma and shame of divorce in order to marry her Singaporean boyfriend. For Siti being 
an impoverished married woman living at home with her family is a much better option than 
being a foreign worker married to a man she does not care for.  
The social and cultural impact that these cross-border marriages will have on Halimah’s 
cross-border grandchildren is not yet clear. While Yusof might assert that his children are 
better off in Tanjung Pinang, the social and cultural capital associated with Singaporean 
citizenship cannot be underestimated. At the same time, it is also important to give attention 
to the significant role that class and ethnicity play in the lives of Singapore’s Malay 
community (Rahim 1998), and not to simply assume that growing up in a more developed 
country necessarily has flow on effects in relation to life opportunities. In making judgements 
about the impact of ‘absent’ fathers on the lives of cross-border children, it is also essential 
not to impose cultural understandings of family life and child rearing practices.  
For centuries women have become involved in relationships with men whose primary 
residence is in another country. What is new about the kinds of relationships these women 
experience in the Riau Islands is that their partners live close enough that access to modern 
transport allows frequent short visits – and the community in which they live is fluid enough 
to allow them to enter the ranks of the lower middle class on the basis of economic resources 
alone. However, it would be a mistake to view these women’s lives as reflective of a new 
form of women’s agency. They are still subject to the same gendered ideologies that shape 
the lives of other Indonesian women, including expectations about women’s roles in 
marriage. Their foreign husbands also hold entrenched ideas about sex roles, and there is 
some evidence to suggest that men seek out wives and mistresses in the Riau Islands because 
the women are regarded as more ‘traditional’ and therefore submissive towards their 
husbands.24 Most importantly, however, women’s life choices as cross- border wives are 
constrained by gender imbalances that reflect the economic differences between Indonesia 
and Singapore. As the primary breadwinners their husbands control the household finances, 
and determine when the couple will be together and when they will live apart. Ultimately it is 
also the men who possess the power to withdraw from their cross-border relationships, 
leaving the women with little legal recourse in relation to maintenance or division of assets, 
unless the couple has purchased a house in the wife’s name. However, these stories 
demonstrate that cross-border marriage opens up new opportunities as well as entrenching old 
oppressions. They challenge the assumptions, which underpin macro-level analyses of 
international marriage, about the power of the state over family formation and the importance 
of formal citizenship rights for everyday practices. The state is not absent from the lives of 
women like Ani and Lia, Katijah and Mardiyah, or Siti, but nor is it omnipresent. It is just 
one of many factors these women and their partners take into account when deciding how to 
live their lives in the borderlands.  
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Notes 
1 There is a considerable body of research on borderland communities which demonstrates the limits of the state. 
For an overview of these issues see Donnan and Wilson (1999), Cunningham and Heyman (2004), and 
Horstmann and Wadley (2006).  
2 The research on which this paper is based was funded by an Australian Research Council (ARC) Discovery 
Project grant: In the shadow of Singapore: the limits of transnationalism in insular Riau (DP0557368) – see 
project website http://www.uow.edu.au/arts/research/intheshadow/. 
3 In contrast to Bintan and Karimun, Batam was largely unoccupied jungle prior to the 1970s. Today it is dotted 
with large-scale industrial parks, tourist resorts, administrative infrastructure, and housing estates, and boasts a 
population of almost 600,000 largely as a result of internal migration from other parts of Indonesia (BPS-Kota-
Batam 2004). For a discussion of the significant differences between Batam and Bintan, see Ford and Lyons 
(2006).  
4 For a discussion of Singaporean men’s relationships with their mistresses, see Amster and Lindquist (2005).  
5 These types of relationships are similar to those observed amongst ethnic Chinese businessmen from Taiwan, 
Hong Kong and Singapore working in the People’s Republic of China (Tam 1996, Lang and Smart 2002, Yeoh 
and Willis 2004, Shen 2005). Studies of these business communities suggest that taking mistresses is an integral 
part of a transnational business culture and form of transnational business masculinity that encourages the 
pursuit of ‘play’ by foreign businessmen (Shen 2005, p. 420). In the Riau Islands, however, the practice of 
taking second wives is predominantly a working-class or lower middle-class practice.  
6 Pseudonyms are used throughout this paper at the request of informants. The stories recounted here are based 
on in-depth interviews conducted between November 2004 and August 2006. All interviews, which were taped 
and transcribed, were conducted in Indonesian or Malay and translated into English by the second author.  
7 Interestingly, all the couples we spoke to were married in Indonesia. In the case of Singapore, this may be 
related to two factors – the cost of wedding ceremonies in Singapore, and the bureaucracy surrounding 
marriage. Where a Singaporean seeks to marry a foreign citizen in Singapore, the future spouse must supply a 
letter from their country of origin confirming his/her marital status; a letter of approval from the Work Permit 
Office, Ministry of Manpower if the future spouse is a work permit or ex-work permit holder; and in the case of 
Muslim marriages where the future spouse is an Indonesian, Malaysian or Bruneian citizen, the intended spouse 
must provide a letter of non-impediment from the local registry of marriages or approved Islamic body (Registry 
of Marriages 2002). One of our informants, a Malay Singaporean man, claimed that the cost of getting married 
in Singapore was so high that he married his wife in her home town of Tanjung Pinang.  
8 For further discussion of the marginal status of sex workers and the opportunities presented by marriage to 
foreigners, see Lyons and Ford (2008).  
9 See, for example, Lisa Law’s discussion of marriages between sex workers and their clients in the Philippines 
(2000).  
10 International marriages between Malay Singaporean men and Riau Islander Malay women have been 
occurring for generations. They were especially common during the 1950s, and the marriages described here 
reflect those longstanding ties.  
11 As many Singaporean – Indonesian couples in the Islands are not legally married this law does not apply and 
their children are eligible for Indonesian citizenship.  
12 In Indonesia, janda (divorcees or widows) are frequently the object of community distrust ‘regarding [their] 
sexual activities because they are no longer under the supervision or control of fathers or husbands’ (Brenner 
1998, p. 163). Marriage, even as a second wife, reinstated Lia’s position as a socially (and morally) acceptable 
member of the community.  
13 We are not suggesting that all cross-border marriages involving Indonesian women from the Riau Islands 
demonstrate a similar pattern. Many women who marry foreign men migrate to join their spouses. However, the 
phenomenon of cross-border marriages described in this paper is sufficiently prevalent to be worthy of separate 
attention. It is impossible to quantify the number of couples who live across borders because no state authority 
has sought to measure its incidence.  
14 The cost of a return ferry ticket to the islands in September 2006 varied between S$25 and S$30.  
15 In contrast, the foreign husband of a Singaporean woman must show that he is gainfully employed.  
                                                          
                                                                                                                                                                                    
16 These cases are analogous to the situation faced by many working-class Hong Kong men who marry women 
from Mainland China (Lang and Smart 2002, So 2003).  
17 The ICA often requires Indonesian tourists to demonstrate that they have enough financial resources to 
support their stay in Singapore. Those without sufficient money are assumed to be entering Singapore to engage 
in illegal work and thus refused entry. As a freelance sex worker, Lia often travelled to Singapore to meet 
clients. Unlike Ani, she never had trouble getting in. She asserts that getting through is all a matter of having the 
right attitude, dressing appropriately, and showing the right amount of uang tunjuk.  
18 Whether this situation will change as a result of amendments to the Citizenship Law in relation to dual 
citizenship is still unclear (see Tjakrawinata and Wellesley 2006).  
19 During the crisis, the purchasing power of the Singaporean dollar increased by a factor of more than five. The 
Rupiah fell from Rp. 1779 for S$1 at the beginning of August 1997 to a low of Rp. 9575 in mid June 1998, 
before stabilizing at around Rp. 5000 in late 1998.  
20 September 2006, Rp.1,000,000 = USD110  
21 September 2006, 1000 MYR = USD274. 
22 In this sense, these men have much in common with international labour migrants who spend much of their 
working lives abroad supporting their families ‘back home’.  
23 Nicole Constable describes a similar situation amongst Filipinas who become ‘mail-order brides’. She argues 
that the women don’t simply marry to migrate, but migrate to achieve a desired goal of marriage which is an 
important aspect of their self-fulfilment (Constable 2003, p. 164).  
24 In the words of Haji Handarlin, Head of Riau’s Muslim Affairs Office, ‘Indonesian women are more docile 
and can look after them. Singapore women are always so busy and they [Singaporean men] can’t get enough 
physical and sexual satisfaction’ (cited in Arshad 2003)  
